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Monday, October 2, 2017

Why CHHAMB Continues To Matter: A Historical Perspective

Unless we derive lessons from our past mistakes, we are condemned to repeat those very same mistakes in future. This is what we can learn after conducting critical appreciations of the all of India’s wars and near-war situations with Pakistan since 1965. Publicly available critical literature (see the books below) now enables us to go back in time to map out as well as draw objective inferences from the past military campaigns of the subcontinent in a chronological manner with a reasonable degree of accuracy—all of which will serve to dictate the inevitable next round of military hostilities between India and Pakistan in the time to come. And these in turn will dictate the nature of India’s future war directives/rules of engagement (to be issued during peacetime to India’s armed forces by the executive branch of the Govt of India), and these in turn will dictate the articulation of both the joint warfighting doctrines and tactics of India’s three armed services, plus their respective force modernisation plans.
For any war planner to understand plan an integrated AirLand warfighting campaign aimed at liberating Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir, the first and foremost task is to study and analyse the military campaigns of the Indian Army’s Western Theatre Command that were conducted in 1965 and 1971, starting with the UN-sponsored/sanctioned 1948 Karachi Agreement and the limitations it posed on India’s military options with regard to Jammu & Kashmir, followed by an appreciation of Chhamb’s terrain/topography.
1948 Cease-Fire Line Explained
Terrain/Topography of Chhamb Sector
Military Options in 1965
Military Balance
Operation Gibraltar & Its Aftermath
Pakistan’s OP Grand Slam
Indian Army Ripostes
Awesome Power of Defence: How IA’s 2 Independent Armoured Brigade Decimated PA’s 1 Armoured Division in Asal Uttar Between September 8 & 11, 1965
IA’s XI Corps Battle Plan.
IA’s 4 Mountain Division Battle Plan.
IA’s 3 Cavalry Regiment stages forward to Chabal Kalan & moves up to Bhikkiwind/Patti at 6am on September 8.
PA 1 Armoured Division’s Battle Plan.
IA’s Armoured Outflanking Movement.
With boggy terrain to the east & the centre held by the IA in Asal Uttar, PA’s 4 Armoured Brigade had only one route open: from the west. Upon getting information of enemy MBT build-up around Bhura Karimpur, Salim selected his ‘Killing Ground’ to trap the enemy.
IA’s 3 Cavalry Regiment, deployed in two concentric semi-circles, awaits the enemy. The trap is now set.
PA’s 4 Cavalry Regiment is completely destroyed in detail.
On September 11, two Squadrons of PA’s 4 Cavalry Regiment are destroyed while the remnants are captured at Mahmudpura, including the Commandant and two Squadron Commanders. The PA’s 3 Armoured Brogade withdraws.
 The End-Result
Inferences
First, it is obvious that the war directives (Higher Directions of War) were NEVER clearly spelt out by the then Govt of India. When it was the stated policy of India even then that Jammu & Kashmir was an integral part of India and Pakistan was illegally in occupation since 1948 of vasr areas of J & K, the Govt of India should consequently have directed both the Indian Army and Indian Air Force to plan their respective war campaigns in a manner that would have ensured the recapture of maximum territory within PoK, while ensuring the territorial inviolability of India against any offensive AirLand war campaigns waged by the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force (see the original 3-point directive that was issued on September 3, 1965 below). 
Had such directives been issued by 1963 itself, then the Indian Army would not have been required to wage OP RIDDLE and OP NEPAL inside Pakistan, all of Pakistan’s initial military gains in Chhamb would have been reversed, and at the subsequent post-war negotiations in Tashkent India’s principled stand would have made it impossible for the USSR to demand that all captured territory by either warring side be returned unconditionally.
 
Second, it is evident that the UNMOGIP’s military observers had given ample advance warning to India about the Pakistan Army’s concentration of forces around Chhamb. Consequently, the Indian Army had at least 30 days of warning time to shore up its ground defences and finalise its joint warfighting plans with the Indian Air Force. The failure to do the latter cost India dearly in the early hours of OP GRAND SLAM.
Third, it remains a mystery why two of the Indian Air Force’s four Mi-4 helicopters that were armed were never used for immediate air-support on the battlefields. Had they been used, then by 1971 additional armed Mi-4s would have been available in the western front for helping India achieve the desired decisive results. Though the Indian Air Force was never found wanting when it came to providing close air-support, these were ineffectual in fluid battlefields where it was impossible to chart out the forward line of own troops (FLOT). And this is exactly why there were several blue-on-blue engagements in 1965 where the Indian Army was often at the receiving end of the Indian Air Force. Had the armed Mi-4s been fully integrated with the Indian Army’s combat net radio grid and had they been co-located as integral assets with the Army’s ground formations, then valuable lessons on the intricacies of delivering immediate air-support would have been learnt then itself, and consequently, by 1971 the Indian Army could well have possessed its own fledgling fleet of armed helicopter-gunships! 
Fourth, as the slides below reveal, there was virtually no joint forces training between the Indian Army and Indian Air Force, as a result of which the Army was devoid of immediate air-support whenever required, while the Air Force was devoid of actionable situational awareness inputs from the Army whenever it came to mounting ‘search-and-destroy’ counter-surface force operations’ (CSFO). Actionable situational awareness inputs could have been forthcoming had the Indian Army used its covertly-inserted special operations forces (SOF) inside hostile territory for the sake of monitoring and reporting enemy logistics-related movements through major road/railway junctions.
Fifth, the infantry-heavy formations of the Indian Army were motorised/lorried and therefore could never keep up with the fast-moving armoured cavalry formations. The absence of mechanisation was galling. 
1971 Operations Conducted in Chhamb & Chicken’s Neck Sectors
The above-mentioned narrative of HQ Western Command clearly indicates that detailed war directives from Indian Army HQ were not issued till November 1, primarily because Indian Army HQ itself had not been briefed on the politico-military objectives by the Govt of India. As the pages below will reveal, the various Corps HQs and their field formations of the Western Command were busy planning their respective tactical offensives, until December 1 when Indian Army HQ issued its military directives that mandated the conduct of strictly defensive operations. This in turn resulted in the Jammu-specific formations having to conduct last-minute tactical and logistics-related re-orientations, all of which enormously helped the Pakistan Army realise its offensive war-plans for the Chhamb sector.
Chicken’s Neck Sector Operations
Analysing The Chhamb Sector Operations
The above-descriptions of the battles are official accounts that are devoid of critical appraisals. A far more objective assessment of the prevailing ground realities and shortcomings at the operational-level can be found below.
Other Armoured Campaigns on the Western Front
IAF Air Campaigns on the Western Front
Inferences
Again the politico-military objectives were never articulated to the optimal-level by the Govt of India. While the eastern sector got the attention that it deserved (resulting in an overwhelmingly successful OP CACTUS LILLY), the western front was glossed over. The then Govt of India should have mandated that while the Indian Army was free to conduct minor tactical offensives aimed at straightening certain bulges (like the Shakargarh Bulge and the Chicken’s Neck), top-most priority should have been accorded to: 1) staging major armoured offensives in the Chhamb-Sialkot sectors, and 2) capturing as much territory as possible throughout northern and north-western PoK, going so far as Skardu and the Deosai Plains. In fact, the Indian Army at that time did possess enough numerical superiority and offensive firepower for achieving these objectives. Yet again, it was only the myopic political leadership of that time that failed to spell out the desired PoK-specific war directives for the benefit of the Indian Army and Indian Air Force. 
Consequently, there arose a lack of doctrinal clarity within the Indian Army, which in turn prevented the much-needed institutional re-structuring in terms of increased mechanisation and the introduction of immediate air-support rotary-winged platforms within the Army Aviation Corps.
After 1965, the Indian Air Force had greatly reformed its CSFO operating protocols and these were highly successful on the eastern front, where the Indian Army’s offensive ground formations never operated in a vacuum and always enjoyed excellent synchronisation with the Indian Air Force. This was primarily due to the invaluable actionable situational awareness inputs coming from the Bangladeshi Mukti Bahini.
As a result, the Air Force’s Su-7BMK and Hunter interdictor/strike aircraft deployed on the eastern front were each able to able to mount three CSFOs on a daily basis. However, this feat could not be replicated on the western front since, once again, the Indian Army was unable to provide actionable situational awareness inputs.
It was due to this that over a period of 12 days, the Indian Army’s 1 Corps managed to advance a bare 13km against Pakistani covering troops.
The 1972-1998 Period
Common-sense would have dictated that after 1971, the Indian Army ought to have been authorised to raise its own Army Aviation Corps that would be equipped with recce-and-scout helicopters (RSH), attack helicopters, and medium-lift utility helicopters for casualty evacuation. Instead, the Indian Air Force continued to oppose the Army’s procurement of different types of helicopters, even after the Army Aviation Corps was established in 1986. At that time, in the Joint Implementation Instructions, it was mandated that the Army Aviation Corps would operate only helicopters below 5 tonnes in weight. Since then, the Air Force has successfully cited this document to block the expansion of the Army Aviation Corps. The blame lies with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which has consistently avoided a decision, preferring to refer to this contentious issue as being “a family affair”. Whenever the Army Corps Aviation sent up a proposal relating to aviation assets, the MoD would send it to Air HQ for comments, knowing full well that the Air Force would effectively kill the proposal.
The Indian Army’s in-house think-tanks, which after OP Parakram in 2002 had been hard at work aimed at turning the lumbering Army into an agile, lethal, versatile and networked force capable of matching the PLA’s on-going force-modernisation efforts through re-organisation, restructuring, force development and relocation (all these being based on 13 transformation studies carried out so far), had by 2011 come up with a firm plan for expansion of the Army Aviation Corps whose main elements were: Creation of integral Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) for each of its three Strike Corps and 10 Pivot Corps over a 15-year period between (2007-2022), with each CAB attached to the Strike Corps comprising two squadrons each with 12 attack helicopters, one squadron with 10 ‘Rudra’ helicopter-gunships (for armed tactical battle reconnaissance and casualty evacuation) and five single-engined RSHs. The CABs attached to the Pivot Corps were to comprise two squadrons with 24 ‘Rudra’ helicopter-gunships and one squadron of 15 Mi-17V-5 helicopters configured for Battalion-level armed air-assaults and casualty evacuation. Even this plan has since been short-changed, with the Army being allowed to operate only the ‘Rudra’ helicopter-gunships and RSHs.
While in May 2011 the Air Force had offered to surrender its sovereignty over the Mi-25/Mi-35P attack helicopters, this was not acceptable to the Army, which at that time also insisted on raising its integral Combat Aviation Brigades (for conducting vertical envelopment air-assault operations) equipped with armed medium-lift utility helicopters—something which the Air Force objected to. And this, despite the fact that in neighbouring Pakistan, it is the Army’s Aviation Corps that has had since the mid-1980s as its integral assets the fleets of AH-1S HueyCobra helicopter gunships, AS.350B3 armed light observation helicopters and Mi-171 medium-lift utility helicopters.
However, from in the mid-1970s till the late 1980s, the Indian Army did receive authorisation to massively upgrade and expand its land-mobile air-defence artillery network, which on January 10, 1994 led to the creation of the Corps of Army Air Defence. By the mid-1990s, therefore, the Army was well-equipped with two land-mobile Air-Defence Groups equipped with 36  ZRK-SD Kvadrat MR-SAM TELs, 80 OSA-AK and 80 Strella-10M SHORADS TELs, 96 ZSU-23-4 Schilka SPAAGs, 40 mounted ZU-23-2s (out of the 468 ordered), 200  Oerlikon Contraves Super Fledermaus LLAD-FCS, 80 Flycatcher LLAD-FCS, and 40 Reporter LLAD tactical air-control radars.
In addition, the long-overdue process of mechanisation of of the Army’s lorried infantry formations began in earnest since the early 1980s, once service-induction of the 14.3-tonne BMP-1/2 ‘Sarath’ tracked infantry combat vehicles (ICV) began. The first 700 BMP-2s were ordered off-the-shelf in 1984 from the Soviet Union and were delivered by Kurganmashzavod JSC between 1987 and 1991.
An additional 1,000 BMP-2s were ordered in 1985, these being licence-produced in India between 1992 and 2003 at the OFB’s Medak-based facility in Telengana. Yet another 123 BMP-2K ICVs were ordered in 2006 from Russia and were delivered between 2007 and 2008. Another 289 BMP-2Ks—ordered in 2009 and 2011—are now being delivered by OFB Medak. Finally, In October 2014 the MoD gave its nod to OFB Medak to produce 362 more BMP-2s, including 116 NAMICA-2 vehicles.
Against the authorisation of 2,827 and 323 BMP-2s respectively, the Mechanised Infantry and the Corps of Electrical & Mechanical Engineers are today holding only 2,521 and 170 vehicles in various versions that include the. BMP-2 ICV, the armoured amphibious dozer, armoured engineering and recovery vehicle, armoured ambulance, CBRN recce vehicle, carrier command post vehicle, carrier mortar tracked vehicle (198 units), and communications vehicle.
Earlier in 1987, the Indian Army—being acutely aware of the T-72M’s vulnerabilities, had decided to undertake Project Bison—an ambitious upgrade project in cooperation with Yugoslavia’s state-owned Yugoimport SDPR, under which all its T-72Ms would be fitted with the SUV-M-84 digital fire-control system that incorporated a Hughes-built gunner’s sight that was stabilised in two axes and included a thermal imager and laser rangefinder. The gunner’s ballistics computer—developed by Banja Luka-based (in today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina) RUDI ÄŒAJAVEC Rudi Cajevec—was designed to automatically download cross-wind data, vehicle cant, azimuth tracking rate and range, while the gunner manually inputted the data for air-pressure, air temperature, barrel wear, barrel droop and ammunition type. Also planned for retrofit was the 12-cylinder water-cooled V-46TK 1,000hp diesel engine, that would have given the T-72M a power-to-weight ratio of 24.10 hp/tonne (thereby replacing the V46-6 engine that was rated at 780hp). A procurement contract was signed with Yugoimport SDPR in early 1989 and an advance down-payment was made as well, but by 1991, Project Bison had to be scrapped in its entirety as by then civil war had broken out in Yugoslavia, and the country was subjected to an UN-mandated universal arms export/import embargo.
Under Nuclear Overhang
When, as a consequence of the Wangdung/Sumdorong Chu Incident in 1986, the Govt of India a year later authorised the commencement of weaponisation of India’s strategic nuclear deterrent arsenal, it was also incumbent then upon the Govt of India to take the country’s armed forces in to confidence so that a comprehensive ‘Strategic Defence Review’ be conducted in order to re-orientate the military warfighting doctrines and the consequent force modernisation efforts of India’s three armed services. Sadly, this was not done (until late 2002), with the Govt of India choosing to instead rely only on the scientists and technocrats of the country’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO) for strategic guidance on operationalising India’s nuclear deterrence posture, little realising the dangerous consequences this was to have in future in terms of diminishing India’s conventional military deterrence—which became evident 12 years later.  
By 1989 India was buffeted by economic crisis, political and social demoralisation, and communal polarisation, while Punjab was still gripped by an active rural insurgency/urban terrorism, while Pakistan was then of the firm belief that the fruits of the decade-long Afghan Jihad could be replicated with success inside Jammu & Kashmir (J & K) by whipping up revisionist/distorted religiosity. Consequently, after the V P Singh-led government was sworn in on December 2, 1989, the kidnapping of 23-year old Rubaiya Sayeed (daughter of the then Indian Union Home Affairs Minister Mufti Mohd Sayeed) by the Pakistan-based Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) took place on December 8. This incident, along with overt Pakistani raising, funding and arming of various Pakistan-based terrorist ‘tanzeems’ (like the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen or HuM) opened the floodgates of terrorism inside J & K. By January 1990 a concentrated and venomous campaign by the JKLF and HuM was initiated against J & K’s minority Kashmiri Pandit community throughout the Kashmir Valley through toxic hate-preaching systematically emanating from several Mosques inside the Valley, This on January 18, 1990 reached a fever-pitch, which in turn led a day later to the mass-exodus of some 300,000 Pandits from the Valley to safer areas in Jammu and elsewhere outside J & K. On February 5, (when the then PM of Pakistan and Benazir Bhutto and the then Chief Minister of Pakistan’s Punjab province Mian Mohd Nawaz Sharif were trying to outdo one another when it came to supporting the ‘Kashmir cause’) a thousands-strong crowd of Pakistanis tried to forcibly cross the LoC and they were fired upon by India’s Border Security Force, which led to several casualties. A few days later, yet another attempted crossing was also fired upon. On March 13, at a rally in Muzaffarabad, Benazir spoke about waging a 1,000-year war for the sake of Kashmir, while India retorted by stating that if it came to war, Pakistan would not last for even 1,000 days. While Benazir was dismissed as PM in August 1990, the V P Singh-led government fell in November 1990. In February and late March 1992, attempted crossings the LoC—this time by the JKLF—was thwarted by Pakistan’s then PM Nawaz Sharif. In mid-October 1993 a group of terrorists holed themselves up inside the Hazratbal Shrine in Srinagar (a similar incident had taken place in 1963) along with 150 pilgrims who were held as hostages, and demanded safe passage, threatening otherwise to kill the hostages, blow up the mosque and destroy the relic of the Holy Prophet that housed inside the shrine. Though this crisis was resolved peacefully by mid-1993, India clearly interpreted as this as being nothing but an overt re-enactment of 1965’s OP GIBRALTAR.
This was what made India undertake a national endeavour on February 22, 1994 when India’s Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution that firmly declared that the State of J & K has been, is and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means, and that Pakistan must unconditionally withdraw from PoK, which it had forcibly occupied through military means. This parliamentary articulation of a position hitherto implicit or left understated was, in fact, a tectonic change that many ar that time had failed to grasp. But the Indian Army had grasped and understood the full politico-military implications of this resolution, and therefore it began the process of revisiting its force modernisation plans. Consequently, in March 1994 Army HQ formulated its GSQR for tracked self-propelled howitzers (T-SPH) SP by using the 152mm 2S19M1/MSTA-S T-SPH as the baseline performance parameter benchmark. In response to a subsequently-issued RFI, proposals were received in December 1994 from five OEMs and subsequently, field mobility-firepower trials on a no-cost no-commitment basis of four different hybrid T-SPHs (from France, the UK, Russia and South Africa) were conducted between April and July 1995. During these trials, the option of using the T-72M hull for mounting the turret-mounted howitzer proved to be a failure due to powerpack-related mobility deficiencies and thus IA HQ rejected all four offers.
What was required at this stage from the P V Narasimha Rao-led government were new war directives that emphasized the importance of waging limited high-intensity conventional wars of limited duration under a nuclear overhang, which would have replaced the then warfighting doctrine of all-out wars based on overwhelming retaliation—which was conceived in the early 1980s and was based on Gen Krishnaswami Sundarji’s  (who was the Army’s COAS from February 1, 1986 till April 30, 1988, or 820 days) Combat Papers I and II (that were published when he was Commandant of the College of Combat in Mhow in 1980-1981).  In fact, Gen Sundarji himself revisited his classic expositions of the Army’s thinking on this subject in his novel, titled ‘Blind Men of Hindoostan’—a suggestively fictional account of his own thoughts on the subject—in 1993. However, India’s ruling political elite at that time had no stomach the glaring objective ground realities, and instead continued to repose more faith in the country’s scientists and technocrats, while totally ignoring the well-meaning operational inputs from the armed forces. Due to this, the end-users of military hardware were forced to accept what the DRDO had to offer, such as liquid-fuelled rocket artillery assets developed by the DRDO’s Hyderabad-based  Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL) Research Centre at Imarat (RCI). Subsequently, the Indian Army raised its 333 (in June 1993 and commissioned in October 1995), 444 (raised in October 2003) and 555 Missile Groups (operational by January 2005), each equipped with a total of 60 liquid-fuelled, conventional warhead-armed, 150km-range Prithvi SS-150 surface-to-surface battlefield support missiles (SSBSM), including reserve rounds.
Each SS-150 Missile Group was made up of two Sub-Groups that in turn were made up of two Troops. Each Troop had two SS-150 mobile autonomous launchers (MAL). Thus, each Group had 8 launchers and almost 24 support vehicles (including the Fuel Carrier, Missile Transporter, Oxidiser Carrier, Warhead Carrier), while the number of MALs was then expected to eventually treble to 24. In times of hostilities, the missiles were required to be pre-fuelled (the shelf-life of the liquid propellant while in storage was 10 years) before being deployed to their launch sites where only three vehicles—the MAL, power supply vehicle and one Mobile Command Post (MCP)—would need to be employed. The Prithvi SS-150—officially described by the DRDO as a tactical surface-to-surface missile and by the Army as a battlefield support missile--was fuelled by a liquid propellant (a 50:50 combination of isomeric xylidine and trimethlyamine), with the oxidizer being inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA). The propellant had a 260 specific impulse—as specified by the Army, which required a range fluctuation between 40km and 150km—and this, according to the DRDO, could only have been achieved by a variable total impulse best generated by liquid propellants. When it achieved operational status, the SS-150, equipped with a strap-down inertial navigation system, had a CEP of 300 metres. Warhead options for the SS-150 included the standard high-explosive unitary warhead (weighing 1,000kg), pre-fragmented and cluster munitions, an incendiary warhead, and a fuel air explosive warhead.
 
Following its launch, the SS-150’s semi-ballistic trajectory took it to an altitude of 30km following which it adopted either a steep downward trajectory at nearly 80 degrees, or a lift-augmented descent trajectory. As far as the latter option went, there were six flight-path variations available (which were pre-programmed prior to launch) in order to defeat or confuse hostile air-defence systems. It is evident from all this that the SS-150, during, hostilities, was envisaged by the DRDO to be meant to be employed for massed, but not effects-based, fire-assaults against largely static targets like troop concentrations, plus railroad and POL junctions, this being done in order to severely degrade the hostile force’s theatre-level conventional force reserves before they could become effective in the forward tactical battle areas. The Indian Army, however, never intended to use the SS-150 in such a manner simply because its warfighting formations were required to have situational awareness only out to a distance of 50km within the tactical battle areas.
Similarly, the Indian Air Force too was forced to induct the liquid-fuelled, single-stage, 250km-range, 8.56 metre-long Prithvi-250 into service in 2003. The SS-250 was first test-fired on January 27, 1996 and again on March 31, 2001. Subsequently, the DRDO and the MoD unsuccessfully tried their best to force the Air Force to view such SSBSMs as substitutes for interdictor/deep-strike combat aircraft and induct the 350km-range Prithvi-2 (test-fired on  May 23, 2008; October 12, 2009; March 27 and June 18, 2010; June 9, 2011; December 20, 2012; August 12, 2013; and December 3, 2013) and the 600km-range, solid fuelled, RLG-INS-equipped Prithvi-3 (test-fired on May 19, 2016; November 21, 2016; and June 2, 2017) into service, along with the  150km-range, solid-fuelled Prahar SSBSM (developed in a span of less than two years and test-fired only on July 21, 2011). Such SSBSMs simply had no operational value-addedness, given their inability to deliver actionable, high-accuracy fire-assaults and their large, on-ground deployment footprints.
As a result of these above-mentioned mis-steps on the part of successive governments since 1987, when India conducted the Shakti-2 series of weaponised nuclear devices on May 11 and 13, 1998 (which were followed on May 28 and 30 with similar tests being conducted by Pakistan), the conventional warfighting strategies of the Army and Air Force were totally out-of-touch with the new emerging ground realities, which have since then meant that: 

1) Neither India nor Pakistan could any longer wage all-out AirLand wars of overwhelming conventional retaliation deep inside each other’s sovereign territories, since both possessed the type of nuclear WMDs (with yields not exceeding 4 kT) that could be used defensively within each other’s own territories in order to blunt large-scale conventional AirLand offensives.

2) This consequently will henceforth render the Strike Corps formations of both countries largely ineffective all along the international boundary (IB).

3) Waging limited high-intensity conventional warfare became a distinct possibility for as long as such campaigns were conducted within disputed territories, since this does not constitute any violation of international law.

4) Such warfare has be initiated at relatively short notice by India, since Pakistan is geographically linear (with its north-to-south roads and railways running close to the IB) and therefore the latter can mobilise and deploy its warfighting formations using solely its interior lines of communications within 48 hours.

5) The Indian Army, whose offensive strike formations are located deep in the hinterland, is therefore required to restructure its warfighting formations in such a manner so as to keep them permanently deployed at forward locations (within 100km of both the IB and LoC).

6) This in turn requires the pre-positioning of war-waging hardware and their end-users in up to 10 newly-built cantonments close to both the LoC and what Pakistan refers to as the Working Boundary (WB).

7) The Indian Army’s restructured integrated manoeuvrable battle groups ought to be highly mobile, possess far shorter teeth-to-tail ratio, and possess force-multiplier assets when operating in a fluid battlefield where the operational plans are based on real-time situational awareness.
It is now important to understand the various territorial boundary/frontier references. The State of J & K has 734km of the LoC running through Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh regions from Kargil to Malu (Akhnoor) in Jammu district, while it has 190km of IB from Malu to the Punjab belt running through Jammu, Samba and Kathua districts. The IB between India and Pakistan spans 2,175km. The WB spans 202km, the LoC spans 797km, and the Line of Actual Contact (LAC)—which India calls the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL)—from map-grid reference NJ-9842 till Indra Kol—spans 108km. The LoC runs from a place called Sangam close to Chhamb (which lies on the western bank of the Munnawar Tawi River) all the way up north to NJ-9842 in Ladakh, following which the AGPL takes over. The WB lies in Jammu Division between Boundary Pillar 19 and Sangam i.e. between Jammu and Sialkot, which was part of the erstwhile princely state of J & K. It is this stretch that Pakistan refers to as the WB, since it maintains that the border agreement of 1947 (the so-called standstill agreement) was inked between the princely state of J & K and Pakistan, and not between India and Pakistan.
Even if the then NDA-1 government had by May 1998 publicly announced its intention to conduct a comprehensive strategic defence review aimed at restructuring India’s three armed services in order to address the new ground realities associated with the conduct of limited high-intensity conventional warfare, the chances of Pakistan launching OP BADR against India in northern J & K would have been slim. Given the total ratio of land forces of India and Pakistan, which then was about 2.25 : 1.2 the Pakistan Army’s Military Operations Directorate had then concluded that the initial Indian military reaction would be to rush in more troops inside J & K, thereby further eroding the Indian Army’s offensive capabilities against Pakistan. As a consequence, the MO Directorate concluded that India would not undertake an all-out offensive against Pakistan, since by doing so she would run the risk of ending in a stalemate, which would be viewed as a victory for Pakistan. It is for this reason that the Pakistan Army had then concluded that war, let alone nuclear war, was never a possibility. The Pakistan Army’s consequent operational plan envisaged India amassing troops along the LoC to deal with the threat at Kargil, Drass and Batalik, thereby resulting in a vacuum in the rear areas. By July, the Mujahideen were required step up their sabotage activities in the rear areas, thereby threatening the Indian lines of communication at pre-designated targets, which would have helped isolate pre-determined pockets, forcing the Indian troops to react to them. This in turn would have created an opportunity for the Pakistani forces at Kargil, Drass and Batalik to push forward and pose an additional threat. India would, as a consequence, be forced to the negotiating table. While it is useless to speculate on whether it could in fact have succeeded, theoretically the plan for OP BADR was faultless, and the initial execution, tactically brilliant. But at the strategic-level the Pakistan Army was caught totally off-guard by India’s vertical escalation (by involving the Indian Army through OP VIJAY and the Indian Air Force through OP Safed Sagar) that lasted from April 29 till August 3, 1999.
However, what totally bemused Pakistan’s military leadership at that time was the totally defensive mindset and a total lack of strategic visioning on the part of India’s then ruling political leadership. This was subsequently articulated by none other than Lt. Gen. Javed Hassan—who as the then GOC Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) had played a key role in commanding both Pakistan Army and the then paramilitary Northern Light Infantry (NLI) forces during OP BADR in 1999. He had in the mid-1990s been commissioned by the Pakistan Army’s Faculty of Research & Doctrinal Studies to produce a guide to India for serving officers of the Pakistan Army. In ‘India: A Study in Profile’, published by the military-owned Services Book Club in 1990, Lt Gen Hassan had argued that the ruling Indian ‘baniya’ is driven by “the incorrigible militarism of the Hindus.” “For those who are weak,” he had gone on, “the Hindu is exploitative and domineering.” A highly intelligent and well-read officer, he was more of an academic than a commander, and bore that reputation. He, therefore, was the best-placed with a point to prove in a subsequent military appreciation of OP BADR—this being that OP BADR had provided India with a splendid opportunity to enact its February 22, 1994 parliamentary resolution by embarking upon a prolonged high-intensity AirLand offensive across the LoC that could eventually have resulted in the capture of almost the entire district of Baltistan (inclusive of Skardu and the Deosai Plains) at a time when both the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force were clearly unable to give high-intensity battle for more than a week, since the US, by invoking the Pressler, Glenn-Symington and Solarz Amendments since October 1990 had stopped providing product-support for all US-origin military hardware in service with Pakistan’s military, and also because Pakistan was holding only 48 hours worth of military POL stockpiles at that time.    
This inexplicable defensive mindset of India’s ruling political elite was again in full display during OP PARAKRAM, which was launched in the wake of the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on India’s Parliament, and was the first full-scale mobilisation since the 1971 India-Pakistan war. It began on December 15, 2001 after the Cabinet Committee on National Security’s (CCNS) authorisation and was completed on January 3, 2002. It finally ended on October 16, 2002 when the CCNS belatedly recognised that the law of diminishing returns had been operative for many months already. In the snow-bound areas of J & K the Indian Army had by then relatively few options to launch offensive operations across the LoC, while in the plains of Punjab and Rajasthan the climatic conditions were ideal, but the nuclear overhang became the inhabiting factor. By that time, approximately 52,000 hectares of land along the IB, WB and LoC had been mined with about 1 million landmines. Till July 2003, the Indian Army had suffered 798 casualties due to mishaps in minefields, mishandling of ammunition and explosives, and traffic accidents. The cost of sustaining OP PARAKRAM was pegged by India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) at Rs. 7 crore a day. This worked out to approximately Rs.2,100 crore over 10 months and did not include the cost of mobilisation and de-induction. India’s Parliament was informed in October 2002 that OP PARAKRAM had cost Rs.6,500 crore, excluding the Rs.350 crore paid as compensation to people residing in border states where Indian troops were deployed. The Army was the biggest contributor to the expenses. Figures collated by Army HQ indicated that the cost of mobilisation of 500,000 troops, including pay and allowances, field allowance for one year and transfer grant alone was Rs.700 crore. The wear-and-tear cost of equipment added up to Rs.1,300 crorem while the depletion of mines, ammunition and warlike stores was around Rs.550 crore. Transport and fuel costs together added up to Rs.850 crore.. The total figure for the Army stood at Rs.3,860 crore and did not include the cost of withdrawal of troops (estimated at around Rs.500 crore) and the cost of demining one million mines for which new demining equipment had to be bought from Denmark. Nor did this figure include the cost of deploying (and redeploying) the Navy, the Indian Air Force and the Coast Guard, which was estimated to be another Rs.1,000 crore.
The only one to voice the Indian armed forces’ intense frustration over the continued myopia of India’s then ruling elite was none other than Gen. Sundararajan ‘Paddy’ Padmanabhan, who had served as the Indian Army’s Chief of the Army Staff from September 30, 2000 till December 31, 2002. Going on-the-record on February 6, 2004 (see: http://www.hindu.com/2004/02/06/stories/2004020604461200.htm), he explicitly stated that problems with India’s then prevailing (or obsolete) military doctrine and a lack of clarity within the then Union Cabinet and on its war objectives had undermined OP PARAKRAM at the very outset. Gen. Padmanabhan argued that significant military gains could have been achieved in the first quarter of January 2002, had India’s ruling politicians made the decision to go to high-intensity limited conventional war. These objectives, he said, could have included the “degradation of the other force, and perhaps the capture of disputed territory in J & K. They were more achievable in January, less achievable in February, and even less achievable in March. By then, the balance of forces had gradually changed.” Pakistan, the Indian Army planners had then believed, had an interest in taking the conflict towards a nuclear flash-point as soon as possible. The Indian Army on the other hand believed that the best prospects of avoiding such a situation was having forces in place that could rapidly secure limited war objectives across the LoC. “If you really want to punish someone for something very terrible he has done,” Gen Padmanabhan said, “you smash him. You destroy his weapons and capture his territory.” “War is a serious business,” he continued, “and you don’t go just like that.” Doctrinal baggage, he accepted, had crippled India’s early options in 2002. “You could certainly question why we are so dependent on our strike formations,” he said, and “and why my Holding Corps don’t have the capability to do the same tasks from a cold start. This is something I have worked on while in office. Perhaps, in time, it will be our military doctrine.”
From India’s perspective, the most important lesson that emerged from this standoff was that political and military instruments of national power must work together in a synchronised manner. Deciding to adopt a pronounced forward and aggressive military posture to coerce/compel Pakistan was basically a political decision, and India’s armed forces, excluded from the decision loop, could not immediately adopt the posture its political masters desired. Admiral Sushil Kumar, the Indian Navy’s Chief of the Naval Staff till December 30, 2001, later opined that OP PARAKRAM was the most punishing mistake for the armed forces because the government of the day then lacked any political aim or objective for deploying the Army along the India-Pakistan borders. “There was no aim or military objective for the OP PARAKRAM. I don’t mind admitting that OP Parakram was the most punishing mistake for the Armed Forces. When the Parliament strike took place, in the (CCNS) board-room it was a super-charged atmosphere, as you are aware in the CCNS board-room, the three Service Chiefs sit opposite the Union Cabinet. In the end, PM (Atal Bihari) Vajpayee turned to me and said ‘aap khush nahi lag rahe hain Admiral Sahab’ (You don’t seem to be happy). I said I beg your pardon, Sir, can you give us what is your political aim? We need to derive a military aim from it. That is the whole principle of war. What is the aim, you need an aim and military objective.”
Holding that little attention was paid to the maritime dimension during the Kargil conflict in mid-1999, Admiral Kumar said: “There was no focus on the maritime dimension and the focus was only on the LoC. I had said that Kargil will once happen in the sea and nobody believed me. Eight years later 26/11 happened, but we have never learnt from our mistakes.” Referring to nuclear versus conventional war fighting capabilities, Admiral Kumar explained that nuclear deterrence should not be considered as the replacement for conventional warfighting capabilities of the country. “The problem is that the nuclear mindset we have is a false sense of security. Nuclear deterrence is required but it does not replace conventional deterrence. Conventional deterrence is the real deterrence, it gives you a credible response capability,” he said.
While the conflict in mid-1999 led to the death of 527 Indian soldiers, shockingly, without going to war, 798 soldiers were killed during OP PARAKRAM. In the initial phase itself, around 100 soldiers were killed and 250 injured during mine-laying operations. In the armed forces, there was seething anger against the then government having achieved so little with so much. Hollow now sounded Vajpayee’s rhetoric of “aar paar ki ladaai” and several such allusions to a decisive battle. Those with a sense of history had then asked: is 2002 to Vajpayee what the 1962 debacle with China was to Nehru? Vertical escalation, it calibrated and maintained, would not have spiralled out of control. But after the initial weeks, the strategic surprise was lost by early February 2002. Matters were imprecisely conceived, and that there was no clear political objective to the mass military mobilisation. The subsequent military deployment became a losing gamble of meaningless brinkmanship. No informed cost-benefit analysis about the contours of the available military responses was undertaken. Nor were they preceded by politico-military war-gaming. It came about suddenly, and reeked of ad hocism. In developed countries, such war-gaming is a continuous process, enabling military planners to factor in the strains the political system could come under during wartime, and ways in which it could affect the operation. Of what use then was New Delhi's bluster and sabre-rattling?
The verdict: the 2001-2002 total military mobilisation was a disaster, perhaps the biggest since 1962. Political masters of that time never issued orders to realise any tactical objective, thereby underlining that the military mobilisation was never intended to launch attacks against Pakistan. But this inactivity ultimately extracted a tremendous price. Firstly, it bolstered the assiduously-cultivated Pakistani myth that strategic deterrence has worked for it. Secondly, India’s armed forces seriously degraded their operational reserve of combat hours. What would have happened if India was faced with a repeat requirement in three months? New orders for weapons had to be placed, with consequent lag-times in terms of delivery schedules. Thirdly, as a consequence, India would have had to open herself to new strategic vulnerabilities, thereby getting squeezed in the process. Fourthly, since all combat and support equipment, especially air-defence hardware and precision-guided munitions, have a defined storage life that is measured in terms of hours, once taken out to the field and exposed to uncontrolled environment, such hardware quickly begins to degrade and become useless for combat purposes. This applies across the board, which if kept revved up for 10 months in the desert, would have had their functional abilities impaired.
And what about the alleged overhaul of the national security system post-Kargil and the then Defence Minister George Fernandes’ tall claims of India’s ability to wage a limited war? In reality, what the country got from the ruling political class since then has been a dubious result of less than pyrrhic value. For instance, sample the so-called Cold Start warfighting doctrine of the Indian Army, which was vaguely explained by the then COAS of the Indian Army, Gen Nirmal Chander Vij, on April 28, 2004. According to Army HQ, the reconfigured ground combat formations at each level will be task-oriented in terms of varying composition of armour and infantry elements, with integrated attack helicopters of the Army Aviation and the Air Force, besides battlefield air interdiction (BAI) support coming from the Air Force. Also, there was then much hype about integrated Army Aviation surveillance helicopters, plus command-and-control helicopters.  As per Army HQ, the future battlefields along India’s western borders would involve the use of eight permanently forward-deployed ‘integrated battle groups’, meaning Brigade-sized integrated armoured/mechanised infantry forces with varying composition of armour, field/rocket artillery, infantry and combat air-support that are available to the Army’s Pivot (Holding) Corps-level formations. These ‘integrated battle groups’ would be mobilised within 48 hours and will be operating independently and will thus have the potential to disrupt or incapacitate the Pakistani leadership’s decision-making cycle. As per this school of thought, when faced with offensive thrusts in as many as eight different sectors, the Pakistan Army would be hard-pressed to determine where to concentrate its forces and which lines of advance to oppose. In addition, having eight ‘integrated battle groups’ capable of offensive action will significantly increase the challenge for Pakistani military intelligence’s limited exploration/exploitation assets to monitor the status of all the tactical battle areas, thereby improving the chance of achieving surprise. Furthermore, in a limited war, India’s overall politico-military goals would be less predictable than in a total war, where the intent would almost certainly be to destroy Pakistan as a functional state. As a result, Pakistan’s defensive ripostes against Indian attacks would be more difficult because the military objectives would be less obvious. Lastly, if Pakistan were to use nuclear weapons against the advancing Indian ‘integrated battle groups’, such dispersed formations operating over narrow frontages would present a significantly smaller target than would Corps-level formations.
In reality, the Indian Army’s declared ‘Pro-Active Strategy’ involving the cold-starting of the forward-deployed ‘integrated battle groups’ WRONGLY PRESUPPOSES that in the next round of military hostilities with Pakistan, the politico-military objectives will be clearly spelt out far in advance. And there is no credible evidence on the ground about this being the case as of now. Any military offensive strategy hinging on high-intensity limited war can only be successful if India’s political leadership at the given time of operational execution of this strategy has: the political will to use offensive military power; the political will to use pre-emptive military strategies; the political sagacity to view strategic military objectives with clarity; the political determination to pursue military operations to their ultimate conclusion without succumbing to external pressures; the political determination to cross nuclear thresholds if Pakistan seems so inclined’ and the determination to not shy away from enunciating India’s national interests from which flows all military planning. If any of the above are missing, as they have been from 1947 to till now, the Indian Army’s ‘Pro-Active Strategy’ will not add up to anything.

So, how does go about enunciating India’s national interests vis-à-vis Pakistan? For that, one needs to develop a deep understanding of the nature of the beast. Sample these:

(to be concluded)

287 comments:

«Oldest   ‹Older   201 – 287 of 287
Rajesh Mishra said...

घटक = Component = Ghatak
घातक = Lethal, Killer, Assassin = Ghaatak

Unknown said...

1.Is seeker of Nirbhay locally produced or imported?

SUJOY MAJUMDAR said...

PrasunDa, I completely agree with your below statement

But I have serious problems with all those across the political spectrum who willfully violate their oaths of office & continue to serve as Directors for profit-making entities while at the same time serving as ministers.

As I said in my previous post, the ROT that has set in is irreversible in this country. It's all downhill from here.

Please do not harbor any hope that things will change for the better, it won't. The fault is in our stars that we were born in this corrupt, filthy country.

Thanks, Sujoy

Anik said...

Prasun Da,

BrahMos-A missile and HSTDV test was planned for this year. Will these test happen this year or are postponed?

Also in one of the thread few years back you had said that Air launched Nibhay is also being planed. Is it still in works and when will it be tested?

Anik said...

Indian defense scientists have successfully developed electromagnetic railguns (EMRG) that can fire projectiles at Mach 6.

https://sputniknews.com/military/201711071058896240-india-electromagnetic-railgun-test/

What this above report mentions is a basic EMRG.There were a lot of tender issued by DRDO in past few months to purchase components of EMRG.Is DRDO developing military grade Electromagnetic Rail Gun?

Unknown said...

2.Sir images are surfacing pf some sites of Akash NG's cannister.Is it true.

soi said...

Hi Prasu Da,

A few questions for you:

1. What is the BDL made Amogha ATGM?
2.Is it going to see service any time soon?
3.If no what was the purpose of successful trials in 2016 and if yes when can we expect to see it in service?

Regards
Soikot banerjee

Gessler said...

Hi Prasun ji,

VMT for the previous answers! Regarding the AW101 VVIP choppers - in exactly what condition are the IAF's existing 3 examples? Are they fully capable of conducting their intended roles? If not, by what time can we expect them to be? Also, by when do you suppose we will officially work out all the legal issues with AgustaWestland/Leonardo and take delivery of the next 3?

Thanks in advance!

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To ASHWATTHAMA: It’s simple mathematics & let’s work our way backwards: the total desired reqmt for weapons-grade fissile material is 3 metric tones, as per India’s presentations at the FMCT discussions. To achieve this, the Cirus 40mW PHWR has been in use since the late 1960s till 2005 & the 100mW Dhruva since 1985 is still active & right now work is underway on another PHWR at BARC in Trombay to replace the Cirus. . So, together, how much weapons-grade fissiole material have these two PHWRs churned up so far? Will there even be a need for additional 235mW or 540mW PHWRs for producing weapons-grade fissile material? Not in my opinion. Lastly, the estimate of 100,000 tonnes refers to only the extractable uranium ore, & not the uranium content from the ore. From India-origin ore, the exploitable uranium content is quite low, at about 7% if I’m not mistaken. Hence, importing natural uranium from Niger or Kazakhstan or Australia makes perfect economic sense. The FBR, inclusive of PFBR, will use mixed oxide fuel for which natural uranium imported from abroad will require reprocessing in-country & hence not only the FBTR & PFBR, but also the dedicated fuel reprocessing plant will also come under IAEA safeguards. At the time of inking the 123 Agreement, the PFBR was not yet a validated design & was therefore kept out of IAEA safeguards with the proviso that once the PFBR is run successfully, it & all its successors will be subjected to IAEA safeguards. It is due to this that France decided liquid sodium for the PFBR. The FBTR is just an experimental reactor for heavy engineering experimentation & since several Indian IPRs are associated with it, the IAEA accepted India’s PoV, which is that until the PFBR is successfully operated, the FBTR won’t be accessible to the IAEA, but once the PFBR becomes successful, both the FBTR & PFBR will then come under IAEA safeguards.

To RAJ: DRDO always works on several conceptual weapons designs & EMRG is no exception. But to claim that specific weapons of this type for naval applications are being developed is pure hogwash, rest assured.

To THE INDIAN: Had already posted the weblink of the Delfin SSBN’s videoclip & everything is explained there & shown as well. AS for SLBMs, 12 of them will be carried by each of the projected S-5/S-6/S-7 SSBNs. Range will be about 7,000km. All other queries raised by you had already been answered several times before in previous threads.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To SAM: Dr S Christopher in his published interview in the August 2017 issue of FORCE magazine’s page 8 had CLEARLY STATED that by then 13 TURBOFANS had been built in-country & 3 of them had already been tested extensively. So, once & for all, NO turbojets & all such speculation must stop forthwith. I had already revealed data on the indigenously built turbofans here it is again (for the last time):

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/logistics/intech-dmls-launches-indias-first-indigenously-developed-jet-engines/article9534234.ece

• MJE 20 is an indigenously designed & manufactured turbofan with a thrust of 20 Kgf which will be used for an UAV and R/C model aircraft.
• MJE 40 turbofan produces a thrust of 40 Kgf, which can also be used for UAV and R/C model aircraft & has been indigenously designed, manufactured and is planned to be tested by March 2017.
• 100 kgf turbofan produces a thrust of 40 Kgf, which can also be used for UAV and R/C model aircraft & has been indigenously designed, under manufacture and is planned to be tested by March 2017.
• 130 kgf thrust turbofan for small manned and UAV applications is currently under design.
• SJE-350 turbofan with a thrust of 350Kgf which is used for strategic application and is currently under manufacturing for the Nirbhay.
• Turbo Shaft Power engines with a power output of 180 to 250 kW for Small unmanned and manned Helicopters are under design.

After a collaboration with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Bharat Forge, the company decided to develop its own engines. “It is for this reason that we will be ready for certification in 24 months. But the success we’ve seen has pushed us to develop bigger engines. We have the MJE-40 and MJE-100, which will be able to power bigger UAVs. Given that they are turbofans, they will give longer flying hours”.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To RAJESH MISHRA, GOURAV & SAM: GHAATAK is the name for ther 7.62 SLR, whereas GHATAK is the name of the AURA UCAV that is being co-developed by HAL & DRDO/ADE.

To RAD: No one in India is getting the Spice-250. The SAW’s DEW version is an area saturation weapon for spreading EMP & thus does not require pinpoint navigational accuracy.

Lockheed Martin's ATHENA: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XH6NIazR5pA

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x2gjdSjVuJc

Airborne Laser for MRCA: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pr8K1FFfsMs

To RAJESH MISHRA: Hidden Story of Jesus in India:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dcrygSAqfj4

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3VdhKTGx58o

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gKupIFXfTEk

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xHPVHshW0hU

An Iran That lives in India: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=351XAs8nC7w

PROPHET ZARATHUSTRA: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lhPs_2_uApI

To SENTHIL KUMAR: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/07/donald-trump-says-saudi-purge-targets-milking-country/

KSA, Iran, Middle East, Russia Prophecies of Prophet Mohd:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2QvkS8bSAFo

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3hnlJxu1WM

To INTOLERANT PERSON: The IMR seeker is locally produced by ECIL & was developed by DRDL. It’s image is available in the Defexpo 2016 thread.

To SUJOY MAJUMDAR: LoLz! You seem to be in a highly apocalyptic mood nowadays! So let me try to lift your spirits by recommending this for you to read:

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR392/RAND_RR392.pdf

To ANIK: Only BrahMos-A will be test-fired from a Su-30MKI. Nirbhay is being developed in ground-launched, air-launched & submarine-launched versions, since the LACM’s design is identical to that of the Novator 3M-14E Klub that is in-service with the IN & whose long-range version is called Kalibre for the Russian Navy & Russian Air Force.

To SOI: 1) It is the MP-ATGM. 2) Not so soon.3) It will replace the Milan-2/2T ATGMs. Check out the Aero India 2017 threads for its images & brochure.

Technology, Photograpy and Travel said...

Prasun Da is india doing any research of SALT based nuclear reactors ?

Anonymous said...

Prasunda,

1) Cirus and Dhruva are estimated to have churned out about 800 kg of WGPu. The balance requires another source. As long as the the PHWRs that shall remain unsafeguarded under the agreement can function as that source, I have no problems.

2) This 3 ton WGPu requirement covers what we need today: i.e, the situation where PRC does not possess a credible ABM capability. It is a matter of time before PRC acquires and deploys (on a large scale) such a capability: counterparts to the U.S. THAAD, etc.

3) This would increase our requirements drastically, unless we develop thermonuclear warheads to make more efficient use of the fissile material. Such developments need testing.

4) All in all, the combination of restraints such as FMCT/no testing on our deterrent will nullify its credibility on the long run. So long as others block the FMCT, there is no harm in our current stance. If no one else blocks the FMCT, we must.

5) The only benefit from the nuclear deal has been fuel supplies for the power programme. On the weapons front, it has been severely constricting. Ultimately, the nuclear programme may be forced to make a power vs. weapons choice. If so, it should be dedicated to the deterrent.

Ashwatthama

Anonymous said...

Prasunda,

The 100000 tonnes refers to the uranium content. Of course, the ore is low grade and extraction less economical, but the strategic price extracted by the 123 agreement is too high: severe restrictions on the capability of our deterrent.

The best course would be to stick to the deal till domestic uranium mines are fully operational and then move towards breaking it. After all, any nation state has the sovereign right to abrogate an agreement.

Ashwatthama

Varunn said...

We may or may not get anything from US but the strong Pro-US sentiment gripping our military and government will surely ruin our relationship with Russia - India's only true strategic partner. This is absolute madness tass.com/pressreview/974730

Anik said...

Russia alleges India gave US Naval Official unauthorized access to Nuclear Attack Submarine.

http://tass.com/pressreview/974730

https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsub/articles/20171107.aspx

Black box said...

Hi prasun,
You mentioned​ s5 s6 s7 will be based on delfin class(delta 4).Why can't we design it based on Borei-class SSBN since it's a gen nextto delfin.

Kaustav said...

Ok the poor leftist retired bureaucrats have started their rant about Russian sources hinting darkly at India leaking Russian tech secrets to the Americans with the Chakra being the favourite horse to flog to the death. How silly can you really get!

SUJOY MAJUMDAR said...

PrasunDa,

MoD has issued RFI to foreign vendors for manufacturing tanks (Future Ready Combat Vehicle).

https://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/RFI/542/RFI%20FRCV%2008%20Nov%2017.pdf

Based on the specs, which tanks, in your opinion, can fulfill the requirements ?


Meanwhile PrasunDa, 1 lakh Indians have already bought a 1 way ticket to MARS. Either they are in search of Acche Din, or maybe they are anti nationals :)

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/one-lakh-indians-book-ticket-for-mars/articleshow/61571786.cms


Thanks

Anik said...

Big blow to both Single engine fighter jet acquisition program and LCA tejas.

https://t.co/n7brCwkbjP?amp=1

Army issues RFI for 50T MBT to replace T72. Final Good bye to Arjun mk2 MBT program?

https://t.co/n7brCwkbjP?amp=1


Russian newspaper claims that US officials visited INS Chakra.Both Russian and Indian officials rejected the claims.Russians are saying that it's the work of French lobbyists and interestingly it happened the same day when Indian Navy CNS was briefed about Barracuda class nuclear attack submarine at Cherbourg, France.

https://t.co/kH4lyTRPkS?amp=1

CNS in France:


https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/navy-chief-in-france-to-hold-talks-with-top-military-brass/articleshow/61529814.cms

You had earlier said that a jet engine powered Rustum II will be coming out by the end of this decade. Is it still in works? Is single engine-twin boom configuration also planned?

MPATGM is in works since past few years. When will it be tested?

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/no-us-officer-given-access-to-n-sub-on-lease-from-russia/articleshow/61601509.cms

Senthil Kumar said...

Dear Prasun,

Thanks for your comments.

New Saudi-Iran War getting Ready.

Recent announcement of Lebanon Prime Minister Harri Resignation in Saudi Arabia is the first step towards war. Saudi+Israel+US don't want a stable govt. in Lebanon. Both Iran and Saudi uses Lebanon as proxy. Very soon stage will be set by Israel with some reason to start war with Hezbollah. Later this war will be extended

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9I9ccQgKS5s
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yq_LtbtvefM

Rothschild New World Order
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KmO8Lff1uqk


Las Vegas Shooting is a insider Job
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N6oqqqI6IRo


Thanks
S.Senthil Kumar

Millard Keyes said...

While in India they keep talking about Make in India etc - all other countries go ahead and are making India look like a fool - see for instance Thailand https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tU1Gs8V2vmE. No wonder Indians are lining up for Mars because by the time a decision is made in India one would be on and back from Mars anyway! May be Sovereign Secular Democratic Republic should be deleted and instead PROCRASTINATIONAL REPUBLIC of INDIA is a better description.

Sidharth said...

Prasun da,

http://zeenews.india.com/jammu-and-kashmir/pakistan-occupied-kashmir-belongs-to-pakistan-farooq-abdullah-2056200.html

Did Farooq also for seen India occupying/recapturing the POK back. And suddenly he became impatient.

Rajesh Mishra said...

Tass and Sputnik are certainly against India and are Pro-China/Pakistan.

capri said...

turkey seems to become good weapons manufacturer
1 milgem class corvettes seem to be better armed due to well thought design. Why did IN not think on similar lines when IN's corvettes are of much larger displacement. Now that pak will have them how much of a threat are they
2 why can't india make cirit type of small weapons
3 why can't ofb/drdo not make a mpt 76 type rifle
4 turkey seems to be strictly in the anti India grouping. How shud it be countered

capri said...

1 is IAF wrong in putting down LCA [thus indigenous attempts & maybe same fate awaits AMCA as well :(] & opting for foreign single engine aircrafts when countries with no aircraft manufacturing skills of their own like turkey & Korea are going ahead with their own indigenous stealth aircrafts
2 there is a news that a RFI for next gen tanks will be floated soon [FRCV] what happened to the FMBT?
3 wouldn't it be better for if the govt/IAF focuses on getting tejas mk1a productionized and later[mid 2020's] India ask the US to offer the F 35 for the single engined aircraft in a G2G deal to be manufactured in India
4 any chance of India getting the avenger weaponized drone from the US

Millard Keyes said...

@ Capri.
I think India shows hesitation in carrying out a limited strike against Pakistan is due to Turkey-China issue much more than a nuclear overhang. Unlike India where weapons have to be imported largely due to such dismal in house production and snail paced decision making, Pakistan have no such worries. Its finance comes from Saudi Arabia on tap as long as it wags its tail to the Saudi music, all its weaponry is in safe keeping with Turkey and China - meaning - if the time arose, Pakistani Army will lay hands on weapons aplenty from China and Turkey probably free of charge. India on the other than despite its friendships in the region will not have such a luxury because neither the US nor Israel nor Russia will give anything free of charge or on demand. This is partly why the Army chief said the next war India fights must be fought with Indian made weapons. As well as regular Pak military, India will also have to contend with the thousands on ISI payroll much like Hizbollah and Hamas in the ME. Rise of Islamist Turkey with pro Pak policy, Chinese financial and military clout and Russian isolation because of NATO led actions have changed the picture dramatically and I do not believe India enjoys that luxury of military supremacy vis-a vis Pakistan which it did till 1980s. This is my personal view that Turkey-Saudi-China -Ukraine nexus weighs heavily on Indian mind for any preemptive strikes. With what Prasun calls arming without aiming this problem will not be fixed either in the near future.

Rajesh Mishra said...

HAL, ADA and DRDO were very lazy and someone very cunning took the advantage of combining the tender of double jets with single jet so the MMRCA could never proceed beyond a certain limit. Obviously it was to be scrapped at the most crucial time in a most critical manner. Now the ball is clearly in the hands of HAL, ADA & DRDO to rise up to the occasion and accept the challenge in real terms. If not, the import of Rafale and F-16 will be the solution at the cost of dwindling national foreign exchange.

buddha said...

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/armed-forces-say-no-to-advanced-versions-of-tejas-arjun/articleshow/61620740.cms
UR COMMENT SIR

Anonymous said...

Prasunda,

The link below mentions the possibility of the navy going in for reactors of french design for future SSNs/SSBNs.

https://www.dailyo.in/politics/admiral-sunil-lanba-france-nuclear-submarine-scorpene-shipyard/story/1/20543.html

1) Is'nt it impractical if such a decision is taken for the S5/S6 etc., given that changing the reactor design might force a change of the entire sub design ?

2) You say that the S5/S6/S7 are already sanctioned projects with a frozen design, with building to begin once the S2/3/4 are done. Any change in the choice of reactor will therefore, further delay the S5/S6/S7..

Satyaki

Kapil said...

Prasun sir, watch this Pakistani news show from Chhambh. Watch (4:10) how PA colonel lies that IA attacked Chhambh in 1971 but was defeated and left behind 300 bodies. Bloody liers https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RPrFD8jOy6E

Millard Keyes said...

As long as Chhamb and the IOR continues to matter, so will the Indian Navy. I have never taken much notice and when they cited having 150 ships I thought these numbers pertained to FFG, DDG and Corvettes. To my shock I see the IN only has 24 corvettes and about 25 FFG/DDG combined. Given the expanse of the IOR, Arabian sea, Bay of Bengal and the island chains this is ridiculous. Indian shipyards have to produce 4-5 ships a year to build anything close to what the IN requires, given some of the ships are due for retirement. I am not military expert but even considering the fact IN doesn't probably need as many vessels as the Chinese navy, I foresee a need of a minimum 40 corvettes, 50 FFG and 35 DDG spread along the two coasts and no less than 30 submarines. These numbers also take into account the vessels required to form a CBG. Currently the IN can be called a yellow water navy that is - the max distance one can pee from the shore!

Anonymous said...

Hi Prasun,

https://www.dailyo.in/politics/admiral-sunil-lanba-france-nuclear-submarine-scorpene-shipyard/story/1/20543.html

How significant is the Navy Chief's visit to French SSN shipyard?


Best Regards
Raj

Technology, Photograpy and Travel said...

Prasun Da,

Once some time back you have suggested a book on LCA TEjas by a IAF Chief
Can you please paste the cover name of book

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To TECHNOLOGY, PHOTOGRAPHY & TRAVEL: It is the memoir called MEMORIES SWEET & SOUR by former CAS of the IAF, ACM O P Mehra.

To RAJ & SATYAKI: LoLz! It is always a most laughable exercise for me whenever I read all such hogwash dished out by the ‘desi’ retards whose parents never paid attention to the educational myopia of their retarded kids, i.e. all these retards have been consistently dishing out stuff that are total violations of the laws of physics. For example, can you identify any new-generation high reactor-power density PWR for SSNs/SSGNs/SSBNs that use LEU as fissile material? Has China or France ever officially stated that their present-day SSNs & SSBNs use LEU-fuelled PWRs? Nor does the Arihant/S-2 use HEU, because HEU means uranium enriched to 60% & above. The S-2 uses moderately-enriched uranium, neither LEU nor HEU. Lastly, the CNS of IN was shown the virtual-reality design centre by NAVAL GROUP (formerly DCNS) because MDL has built a similar virtual reality design centre for designing both warships & submarines. The only other such facility in India is in Gurgaon & it is co-owned by the IN & Larsen & Toubro. Nor was the CNS givcen any special briefing on the Barracuda-cl;ass SSGN. Instead, it was a briefing on the Cherbourg-based warship/submarine production facilities of the Naval Group in Cherbourg, plain & simple as illustrated by the released photos. Hence, all shit about the Barracuda being offered to India is just that, i.e. bullshit & 100% speculation.

Such trash is similar to the ones being dished out by these ‘desi’ ‘patrakaar retards’ about the US rolke in the IAC-2 project. Little do these retards realise that if the IN were to opt for naval MRCAs of non-Russia origin, then not just the E-MALS, but also a host of other hardware, like long-range navigation aids, precision day/night landing systems, elevators etc etc will have to be of non-Russia origin as well. So why all the focus just on E-MALS??? Is it due to the utter lack of homework on the part of thse ‘patrakaar retards’?

To ANIK, RAJESH MISHRA & BUDDHA: LoLz! So finally the IAF has stated on-record what I have been saying sibce early 2013@ How so? Just do a time-check on when was the first time I had stated that the Tejas Mk.1 LCA was a ‘sub-optimal’ solution & how/why the IAF has begunb using that same term, i.e. sub-optimal. In fact, that term first originatyed in February 2013 just after the then ADA Director at an Aero India 2013 symposium openly admitted that his design team had never even realised that customers of MRCAs always placed crucial emphasis on 2 parameters: the direct operating costs per flight-hour; & the maintenance hours per flight-hour! Consequently, while a Rafale requires only 1 hand-held, notebook-based avionics tester, the Tejas Mk.1 requires 35 of them! Any IAF ground-support crew team will go berserk in such circumstances. Nor will matters be resolved with the Tejas Mk.1A, which for all intents & purposes is totally doomed since it does not contain even a single structural refinement of the Tejas Mk.1’s airframe & fuselage-encased avionics LRUs. Hence, the only VIABLE solution is to end the Tejas Mk.1 programme at 20 aircraft, totally forego the Tejas Mk.1A, & expedite the LCA-AF Mk.2/Tejas Mk.2 MRCA’s developmental process.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To SUJOY MAJUMDAR: This entire FRCV project is turning out to be a comedy of errors & perhaps your utter frustrations about rhe intellectual state of India are well-founded. First, we had this farce that came out on June 10, 2015:

Design Stage. In this stage, there will be a FRCV Design Competition for selecting the best design. Established tank designers will be invited by means of a global RFP (Request For Proposal), wherein the broad design philosophy for the FRCV will be given out, along with the detailed guidelines for conduct of the Competition. The participants will be asked to submit detailed designs based on the FRCV design philosophy. The evaluation and selection of the best design will be carried out by a Design Selection Committee, under the aegis of DGMF, which will have members selected from amongst domain experts and representatives of concerned defence agencies. The selection will be based on detailed and comprehensive Evaluation Criteria. In the first stage, based on the operational requirements and design philosophy given out, participants will submit broad concept designs, giving out the outline configuration and layout of the platform. These will be evaluated and shortlisted by the Design Selection Committee, under the aegis of DGMF. In the second stage, shortlisted participants will be asked to submit detailed designs of the FRCV platform on a common software platform. The detailed designs will be evaluated by the Design Selection Committee. The best design(s) will be shortlisted in order of innovative design and suitability for Indian Army.
Prototype Development Stage. The selected design will be given to nominated DAs. These DAs will then develop the design and produce their respective prototypes. There will be close involvement of the User (Service HQ) and the Design Agency with the DA(s) during the development of the prototype(s).
Production Stage. After the prototypes are successfully trial evaluated, the approved design will be given to one/two nominated Production Agencies (PAs) for bulk production.

This proved that the IA & MoD were living in the 1950s era & today no one even dreams of asking asking various contenders to build their own prototypes of an identical FRCV design!

Now comes the second farce on November 8, 2017: India has decided to procure a new generation, Combat Vehicle Platform, approximately 1,770 Armoured Fighting Vehicles (in various kit combinations) in a Phased Manner. This vehicle, which will be called the Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV), will form the base platform for the Main Battle Tank. The FRCV will replace the vintage T-72 tank fleet. It is also planned to subsequently develop other need-based family of variants on this platform. It will be a tracked fighting vehicle of medium weight (all-up combat weight not to exceed 50 tons ± 15%).

Cont’d below…

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

It should be able to:

(a) Provide Fire Support to Assaulting Forces, when required to do so.
(b) Fire while on the move, accurately.
(c) Fire multiple types of Ammunition, including ATGMs.
(d) Include capability to destroy enemy tanks at ranges higher than he can engage us, in a time earlier than he can fire at us, with very high first round hit/kill probability and acquire targets at a longer range.
(e) Engage low flying manned and unmanned rotary wing aircraft.
(f) Engage enemy massed armour led attacks, when part of a defensive layout.

Family of variants envisaged include: (i) Light Tank–Obstacle Ridden Terrain. (ii) Bridge Layer Tank. (iii) Trawl Tank and Full-Width Engineer Mine Ploughs. (iv) Armoured Recovery Vehicle. (v) Self Propelled Base Platform for other Arms/Combat Support Arms.

The foreign OEM is to indicate the basic Design (Base Model) of a proven Armoured Fighting Vehicle, based on which the current design is being proposed along with the names of customer Army to whom the same on similar AFVs (model of AFV) has been contracted or delivered. The MoD is desirous of acquiring ToT, including detailed design manufacturing know-how of the Armoured Fighting Vehicles being offered by the OEM. Armament: 120mm or 125mm soft recoil cannon. Ammunition (i) KE (APFSDS). (ii) CE (HEAT, HE). (iii) Gun ube-launched ATGM. Power-to-Weight Ratio not less than 25:1hp/ton. Powerplant will be a 1,500hp multi-fuel engine with automatic transmission.

From the above it is crystal-clear that the IA & MoD does not ewant to entertain ANYTHING from the CVRDE, which is shocking, to say the least! Second, there’s only 1 country that will qualify to bid,. i.e. Russia. For, first firm indications of the kind of futuristic families of armoured vehicles required for the future digitised AirLand battlespace emerged 3 years ago when, following 10 years of operations analysis starting in the mid-1990s and the consequential 10 years of military-industrial R & D work that began in 2005, the Russian Army unveiled its Ob’yekt 148 T-14 Armata MBT, the Ob’yekt 149 T-15 tracked heavy fire-support combat vehicle (FSCV), the Ob’yekt 693 and Ob’yekt 695 Kurganets-25 tracked ICVs, and lastly the 8 x 8 Boomerang VPK-7829 wheeled APC. Just prior to that, the Russian Army had already developed the BMPT-72 FSCV, which will in future be superceded by the Ob’yekt 149 T-15 tracked Heavy ICV.

So, since Russia will emerge as the sole bidder, it will be unacceptable to the MoD that will prefer multiple bids. But since no one else will bid, this reqmt will die an automatic death & it will be back to the drawing boards for the 3rd time (a hat-trick), mark my words!

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

Have been busy for the past 2 days covering the Dubai 2017 Air Show. Will be back to active blogging in another 48 hours.

THE AAM INDIAN said...

Dear Prasun,
WILL YOU SHED YOUR VIEWS ON INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S MASS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS, ESPECIALLY THE DRDO NETRA, NATGRID AND C-DOT'S CMS. HOW MUCH OF SUCH MASS SURVEILANCE IS ACTUALLY CARRIED OUT AND DO YOU THINK IT IS ETHICAL.

joydeep ghosh said...

@prasun da

1. the reason why i said we need to get Sialkot back is bcoz while raja Hari Singh signed accession treaty with India that included areas like aksai chin, gilgit baltistan, kashmir jammu, saksgham valley, ladakh and sialkot district. But unknown to India he singed a deal with Pak to handover muslim majority sialkot district that had sikhs as 2nd largest populace. But after taking control of sialkot district Pak used it as pretext to attack the jammu kashmir. This is why taking back sialkot is important to uproot the seed that has resulted in the problem we have suffered for last 70 yrs.

2. while the need for tanks and jets important but lack of warships for me glaring

3. do you really feel air launched Brahmos & Brahmos mini can really do what heavy bombers are expected to do

thanks

Joydeep Ghosh

Ved said...

Dear Prasun,
Will Dassault be actively involved in MK2 since design stage till final product?

Rajesh Mishra said...

So, since Russia will emerge as the sole bidder, it will be unacceptable to the MoD that will prefer multiple bids. But since no one else will bid, this reqmt will die an automatic death & it will be back to the drawing boards for the 3rd time (a hat-trick), mark my words!

Wow! Crux of the matter.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To THE AAM INDIAN: LoLz! You apparently are GUESSING/ASSUMING that mass surveillance is a recent phenomenon. In reality, it has been going on for ages, especially since the days of the colonial raj, when the Brits created the institution of the Special Branch whose ONLY JOB was to gather socio-political intelligence for the internal security forces. After independence, the Special Branches were not disbanded, but instead ALL States of India had created their own Special Branches since law & order is a State Subject. Consequently, the Centre, in order to conduct identical socio-political intelligence-gathering as well as engage in counter-intelligence operations,. Created Subsidiary Intelligence Bureaux (SIB) in every State. So, since August 15, 1946, both the SB & SIBs have been conducting mass surveillance through every means.

To JOYDEEP GHOSH: Yopu’re factually wrong. The Princely State of J & K had given away Sialkot to Pakistan way before August 14, 1947 & that’s why the Radcliffe Line was drawn in such a way so as to include Sialkot within Pakistan while Muslim-majority Gurdaspur was awarded to India. Also, India’s claim to the territory of J & K entered into force only after the Instrument of Accession was signed on October 26, 1947 & therefore India’s jurisdiction remained only on the Princely State of J & K as it had existed on that day, i.e. without Sialkot. That’s how international law is applied & interpreted. What you’re suggested instead is exactly what China insists on with its arbitrary 9-Dash Line in the South China Sea by claiming that China is a civilization state, which is not recognized anywhere in the world today, since the UN recognizes only the territoriality of nation-states.

Bombs can never be substituted with guided-missiles when it comes to the quantum of throwaway destructive high-explosives required to be delivered over a finite area. Only 1 country today, i.e., has the financial might to attack an air base with 57 LACMs.

But don’t get into a tizzy with such matters & instead enjoy these:

http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/bengal-wins-the-rosogolla-battle-authorities-say-sweet-didn-t-originate-in-odisha/story-kAfHmCXBDG03Iogw9fo53L.html

http://www.hindustantimes.com/kolkata/meet-bengal-s-columbus-of-rosogolla-who-invented-the-spongy-syrupy-delight/story-rR7ZBOaI0k24oe2tDg84JO.html?li_source=LI&li_medium=recommended-for-you

Meanwhile, IAS bureaucrat Ashok Khemka scored half-a-century yesterday after he was transferred from his post for the 50th time in his career!

To VED: Of course. Why else do you reckon THALES has developed a smaller & compact version of the RBE-2 AESA-MMR for trial-fitment on to a Tejas Mk.1A?

To RAJESH MISHRA: The only common-sensical option left on the table is this: cancel the procurement of Tejas Mk.1s & Mk.1As & instead procure between 60 & 90 Tejas Mk.1 LIFT versions & concurrently expedite the development of LCA-AF Mk.2 MRCA.

To GESSLER: http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/india-china-in-race-to-reduce-rocket-launch-prices/story-mF7X9RwS5ai1rCjUDYb2zH.html

http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/nepal-scraps-award-of-1200-mw-hydropower-project-to-chinese-firm/story-V4KUxkWb9xg8qtfM26hePL.html?li_source=LI&li_medium=recommended-for-you

AVIC’s UAVs at Dubai 2017 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9RG6bvSrHiw

TB-001 Scorpion UCAV https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hImNRYPLGMw

TYW-1 Tian Ying Sky Hawk UAV https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfSL05SETfo

CH-5 Wing Loong-2 UCAV https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U04iZi3PQAQ

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

Cloud Shadow UCAV https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sVrpIhtAys4&t=119s

Anonymous said...

Hi Prasun,

Armed forces coming out with "Joint Training Doctrine"

http://idrw.org/armed-forces-come-out-with-a-joint-training-doctrine-to-boost-synergy-and-integration/


Would this be in line with what you have been suggesting (simulation/training) for achieving integration of the three services into theater commands?

Best Regards
Raj

john said...

Prasunda,

Could you please comment on improved version of Polish PL-01 for our light tank acquisition.
Looks like present 35 ton tank is suitable for indo-china border. Will they participate in FRCV competition ?

rad said...

hi prasun
the army keeps whining day in and day out about the weight of the arjun and the future tank. I t seems to me that of a classic example of trying to cut the foot to fit the shoe??

it does not take long to build bridges that can take th e weight of the tank instead of giving excuses for foreign tanks??

if thales is offering the smaller version of the rafale aesa then obviously python and derby cannot be integrated as israel will be pissed of and wont allow it. wont israel feal cheated as it was given to understand that the lca was to get their aesa radar ?? can the lca carry the meteor long range missile then? if not it will be waste ?

report suggest that the rbe -2 is better than the 2052 ? is that right or is israel with holding some thing ??

was there a quid pro in the rafale deal regarding the development help for the lca ? the french know better as they have deep knowledge about delta wings?? i believe they were the earlier consultants ? what made us pull away ? were ada so cocksure about their capability to alone ??



Rajesh Mishra said...

"The only common-sensical option left on the table is this: cancel the procurement of Tejas Mk.1s & Mk.1As & instead procure between 60 & 90 Tejas Mk.1 LIFT versions & concurrently expedite the development of LCA-AF Mk.2 MRCA."

As again you are always correct since long, but not a single creature talks about the versatile usefulness of Tejas-LIFT even for CAS and ground strike. This way LCA-Mk 1/1A can survive and LCA AF-mk2 can develop. We have to be with 42-45 Squadrons at least and more Rafale and F-16 even may be required for it.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To RAJ: No, it isn’t. Instead, it has more to do with rationalisation of existing resources, i.e. common-user items.hardware whose product-support can come from unitary sources for the sake of formulating simplified logistics & product support.

To JOHN: LoLz! There isn’t any reqmt for any kind of light tank in India. Heavier tanks like T-72CIA are already operating in Ladakh without any hindrance. There was a time when light tanks were reqd because back then there were no means of transporting heavier tanks other than by land. Today, IL-76MDs can easily airlift T-72CIAs while the C-17As can airlift the Arjun. And as I have explained above, the entire FRCV competition as envisaged by the IA’s RFI is an absolute farce & is therefore impossible to implement.

To RAD: Well, I would very much like the IA to show any existing example of MBTs that are under 50 tonnes while at the same time are capable of operating over varied types of terrain. NOT a single such example exists. Even Japan’s latest MBT that weighs 50 tonnes is meant only for homeland defence & is not meant to operate inside hostile territory, while the Russian Army has refused to order the T-14 Armata in large numbers. Hence, MBTs the world over will continue to weigh more than 60 tonnes, like it or not. Therefore, the only plausible solution for achieving optimum battlefield mobility is for increasing the deliverable power of the diesel-engines/gas turbines, which is exactly what Russia, Germany & the US are doing. THALES is offering a smaller RBE-2 in the hope that this AESA-MMR also gets selected for the LCA-AF Mk.2, thereby ensuring that the MICA family of AAMs becomes standard fit for the Rafales, LCA-AF Mk.2s and upgraded Mirage 2000Ns. And in my view, the Tejas Mk.1A is already doomed & is finally ready for burial since, on performance grounds alone, it remains as sub-optimal as the Tejas Mk.1 for battlefield air-support roles, while in air combat it will be a sitting duck without MAWS fitments & internal jammer, since an externally-carried EL/L-8222 pod will only add more drag & will contribute to lesser AoA-levels being attained—which will reduce the aircraft’s instantaneous & sustained turn rates. Thus, as we can see, no matter which AAMs & AESA-MMR are used, the Tejas Mk.1A will be highly deficient in terms of self-protection & is thus totally rejectable from a cost-benefit ratio standpoint—a point that the IAF recently explained to the GoI’s decision-makers. The only available options therefore are to use the Tejas Mk.1 tandem-seater’s ariframe as a non-combatant LIFT, & focus on optimising the LCA-AF Mk.2’s airframe design ASAP. Procuring both Tejas Mk.1A as well as imported single-engined MRCAs while harbouring hopes for developing the LCA-AF Mk.2 just isn’t an option from any financial angle, rest assured. So, from these 3, if one has to be dropped, then it has to be the Tejas Mk.1A option. But don’t worry, for fairly soon all the drama surrounding the Tejas Mk.1A will soon surface, especially the murky role played by a previous RM who is now back as Goa’s CM.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To TECHNOLOGY, PHOTOGRAPHY & TRAVEL: More recent updates on the Energy Sector of India:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5nDig2FW2dM

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6CLT66FCdzQ

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5hpjMyfxMaU

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Al6sMawNLTg

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8osdAv0CUBc

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DPaG61m9oY0

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nzzRDrWzups

Sidharth said...

Prasun da,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=445&v=ER9ANGf9SOw

According to this IA Lt Gen AB Shivane, FRCV will be fully indigenous.

joydeep ghosh said...

Prasun da

1. you said 'What you’re suggested instead is exactly what China insists on with its arbitrary 9-Dash Line in the South China Sea by claiming that China is a civilization state, which is not recognized anywhere in the world today, since the UN recognizes only the territoriality of nation-states.' if so then why does UN recognize Chinese occupation of Manchuria, Xinziang, Tibet all of which were independent countries; occupation of inner mongolia which was actually part of Mangolia, occupation of Aksai Chin and Saksgam valley/trans karakoram tract that are part of India as part of China. looks UN doesnt have the balls to stop it

2. what you replied to RAD seems good, hope you can feed in your views in the North/South block regarding the same.

3. from what i learned from your blog first HAL/ADA/ADE should work on NLCA Mk.2 that can and should be used for shore based ops from goa, lakshadweep and andaman and then it would be easier to develop LCA-AF Mk.2 at much faster pace. isnt it

4. French prez in coming in next few weeks and seems the deal for 90 rafales will go through, but then what was the purpose of cancelling the 126 jet deal and go for 36 jet in a new deal. isnt it bcoz of that congress is raising questions about it

5. But then the eventual jet count for IAF goes bonkers that include 350 Su30mki, 150 F16 block 70/150 F16/Falcon21,(36+90+90)216 Rafales, LCA Mk2 150, 125 FGFA, 75 PAKFA totals at 46 sqaudrons atleast. all this have to come up by 2035 as i had said previously (not including mirages/jaguar/migs that will retire by 2040 max), however if IAF increases sqaudron strength from 21 to 25 to put in more jets together at one place, what you had proposed its a different arithmetic then

6. i think the joint training manual for IAF/IN/IA released few days ago that says promotion of ‘synergy’ and ‘integration’ but what it doesnt say is the need for using overwhelming numbers for all 3 branches to fight swift and short wars, its simple maths that while one branch fights swiftly with big numbers beside it; if other branch takes time to add numbers it simply creates problem

7. btw what you predicted will happen in 2018 regarding PoK doesnt seem to be happening now as 2018 is on corner & their wont be much time left between snow melts and onset of monsoon in 2018.

these are my views, hope i tried my best

thanks

Joydeep Ghosh

Technology, Photograpy and Travel said...

Thanks Prasun Da ,

But waiting for the day we would have the Power generation with Tidal and waves of the seas surrounding us and i think slowly Coal should be forsaken for power production and should move between Thorium Fast breeder and Wind and Tidal power

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

On November 15, 2017 Tata Power Strategic Engineering Division (SED) was awarded a contract for the supply of portable diver detection sonars (PDDS) to the Indian Navy (IN), intended to enhance the service’s underwater surveillance capabilities and its ability to counter asymmetric threats. The sonars, which are being acquired under the ‘Make and Buy (Indian)’ category of the Defence Procurement Procedure-2016 (DPP-2016), will be manufactured by Tata Power SED under a transfer of technology from Israel’s DSIT Solutions. Tata Power will deliver approximately 50 PDDSs in the first lot, after which their numbers are expected to rise “substantially”.

https://dsit.co.il/wp-content/uploads/PointShield%202015.pdf

http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=0

Anonymous said...

Prasunda,

https://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/English/Public/dpi/articles/secretary-interview-27022017.pdf

This interview of Dr. S. Christopher indicates that the Nirbhay is indeed powered b a turbojet engine (see his reply to the question about the Nirbhay failure).

Satyaki

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To SATYAKI: Why did you post the interview of February 2017 when I had clearly stated that Dr Christopher's interview of August 2017 should be read? Do you have any difficulty with the English language (LoLz!)? Furthermore, can you state with certainty that Dr Christopher is a licensed aeronautical engineer or a missile dersigner & is therefore fully in the know about missiles like Nirbhay? In fact, when it was brought to his notice by me that his observations on Nirbhay's powerplant in the February 2017 issue were DEAD WRONG, he was given the chance to correct his mistakes in the August 2017 issue of FORCE. I have already uploaded above the page containing the August 2017 interview where he corrected his earlier mistake. And the ADE's brochure itself states that Nirbhay is turbofan-powered & I had uploaded it before here:

https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-0meq9OGlEwc/WF7MUkGAbYI/AAAAAAAAMGo/Jdf2XF3XAqwP3wBAHeMcHb4a0CGUJpqWwCLcB/s1600/ADE%2527s%2BNirbhay%2BPoster.jpg

Lastly, anyone with respect for the laws of physics will realise that turbojets are used primarily for tactical cruise missiles, while turbofans have been developed & used for long-range cruise missiles since the 1990s. Despite all this wealth of available data (including Dr Christopher's June 2017 interview), if you still cling to the belief that Nirbhay is turbohet-powered, then you definitely are living in a state of self-defeating denial!

To SIDDHARTH: LoLz! We are talking about a country that relies on imports even for precision ball-bearings for weapons like Dhanush-45 & anyone even dreaming about an indigenous FRCV is, frankly, living in cuckooland! As I had predicted earlier, this entire FRCV project is severely flawed in conception & is practically unimplementable (since it puts the cart before the horse) & in the end kist like the T-90S was imported, so too will the T-14 Armata from Russia. All this will probably borne out later today at this seminar:

https://cenjows.gov.in/calander?month=11&year=2017&date=16

To VED: Looks like China at last has decided to embrace the single-hulled SSK design concept as well:

https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2017/november-2017-navy-naval-forces-defense-industry-technology-maritime-security-global-news/5719-china-s-csic-unveils-three-new-submarine-designs-for-export.html

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

Watch these 2 videoclips & I'm sure you won't stop laughing until your trouser falls off:

Free Balochistan Protests in Geneva: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZPE7IE0HARM

Free Balochistan Protests in UK: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W8xRzYi1Vs8

Meanwhile, the political bastards of the Pappu-led INC are at it yet again:

Needless Controversy on Rafale deal: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W29ECyfuzO8

But this time the IAF's CAS did not take it lying down & has openly stated his disdain:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E_cnA195qWU

Narayan said...

Prasun sir, I think you, like me, are an advocate of a indigenous 60-70 tonne tank (Arjun mk3 or a completely new design) but can such heavy tanks operate in mountaneous terrain along LOC and LAC? If yes, then why is army so obsessed with T-90 type 50 tonne design? Some of best MBTs + Leclerc, Merkava, Leopald, Abram all weight 60-70 tonnes.

rad said...

hi prasun
why dont we take the consultancy of dassault ? after all we have been married with the rafale deal and more to come .It will be much better than trying to fool ourselves that ade or whoever designed the lca can do a better job ie regarding the lca mk2 ?

apart from you ,no one in the gov seems to be talking in terms of lift trainer version of the LCA leave alone any lift trainer . DO they propose to use hawk of that purpose as well ? are there enough hawks?

the army requirement reeks of favoritism to the armata tank , can the mod over rule that?

now what do you make of the report that india is going to make the shorads by itself ???
we dont have the seeker tech ie laser or IIR , is it a dream that is going to take 15+ years like the astra missile ??

in all likely hood we are goin g to get more rafales , now where is the money to go for pakfa or the 100+sigle engine fighter??

what do you male of the recent chinese statement that next time they will deal with doklam issue squarely??

why is there very few write ups about the recent nirbahy launch?

is the surya misisle true or a black program?

Ankit Singh said...

IA acquiring T-14 in the end?
Looks like same saga of T-90 will be repeated where IA will become the largest user of those tanks and only peanut orders will be thrown at the indigenous developments.
Even the russians aren't using the same universal platform.
The SPH version of Armata was based on T-90 chassis.
Arjun has a better chances of becoming the universal platform, shouldn't IA go for that?

Ankit Singh said...

The pappu does not even knows how to pronounce "Rafale" and pronouncing as 'rafael'

Anonymous said...

The conversation on Tejas is getting more and more negative. You are saying that it needs 35 testers. Relatively speaking: Do we know how many tester the Mig-21 needs?

It was designed to replace the Mig-21 and we do not have shortage of manpower and its relatively cheap.

One cannot change design philosophies at this late stage. Its much better and easier to design a new aircraft. If we really are asking for that then why not do it properly. Design an aircraft the size of M2K. Use the Tejas team to do it.

It makes me wonder sometimes what the IAF/ designers were doing. The Pakistanis learn't how the Gripen/F-16 was maintenance friendly and put that into their requirement/design but our boys were asleep it seems. When asked many times what was the contributing PAF made to their aircraft, they kept saying design, design and to be honest I never got that until a long time after what that really meant and your post above.

M.Patel

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To NARAYAN: It is not about heavy MBTs being able to or unable to operate over mountainous terrain. Of course they can. But instead, it is all about transporting heavy MBTs to the area s of operation in high-altitude areas by land or by air. The T-72CIAs now in Chushul were ALL air-transported by IL-76MDs. Now with the C-17As, the Arjuns too can be airlifted. But when one examines the global trend s in high-altitude warfare, especially the solutions China’s PLA is working on feverishly, then it it is: combination of the ZW-11B 2.5-tonne RSH aerosocut helicopters data-linked to armoured vehicles armed with 15km-range ATGMs like Red Arrow-10A/AFT-10 that are either TV-guided or are wire-guided. In addition, the RSH platform also has a fuel cell battery-powered SW-6 mini-UAV that is pylon-launched for providing panoramic situational awareness of the areas ahead. This technique is called ‘manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T)’ in which the SW-6 acts as a companion drone--a wirelessly linked, manned-unmanned aircraft team (MUM-T) that provides both strike and surveillance capability while keeping helicopter pilots & armoured vehicles armed with Red Arrow-10A ATGMs out of danger. This same combination is also best used when RSHs launching the SW-6 act as the extended eyes of a formation of rapidly deployable attack helicopters en route to intercept any intruding hostile armoured formation. This in turn enables the engagement range of heli-launched ATGMs to be increased from 7km to more than 12km—a tremendous force-multiplier by all means. Clearly, therefore, there is no longer the need for using heavy MBTs for high-altitude armoured warfare. Far more practical solutions of the type I’ve outlined above need to be worked upon—as sound common sense would advocate!

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To RAD: HAL can provide the same type of consultancy, but to date no one has answered why HAL’s contribution in such areas was not sought since the late 1980s! The only one who can answer this is Dr V S Arunachalam, the then DRDO Chief in the late 1980s who successfully convinced the then PM Rajiv Gandhi to adopt the totally flawed methodology of developing the LCA Mk.1. It was evident to any qualified person (I.e. a licensed aeronautical engineer) by 2006 itself that the LCA Mk.1’s design & developmental roadmap was totally flawed & unacceptable to the prospective end-users (more about it explained below). But all this emerged in full-view only since 2015 when the stark truth could no longer stay hidden through denials!

The Hawk Mk.132 is a subsonic AJT that can never replicate the sustained supersonic flight of a LIFT--it’s that simple & elementary. That’s why those air forces flying advanced MMRCAs & H-MRCAs still make use of their earlier F-5B & F-5F L-MRCAs as LIFT till this day.

The QR-SAM is the SHORADS & it makes use of Astra-1 missile-body with Agat JSC-supplied Ku-band radar seeker. Money for Rafale is available PROVIDED that wasteful expenditures on FGFA, AMCA, Tejas Mk.1/Mk.1A are stopped ASAP. As for the Doklam issue, do read these:

http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/how-india-has-actually-done-a-great-job-in-dealing-with-the-dragon/story-Cus88ZtjqkqVBZKuAbsdWO.html

http://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/democratic-forces-must-join-hands-to-protect-indo-pacific-from-china-s-hegemony/story-3Juy5BnDIoaR2cApIy8IQI.html

To ANKIT SINGH: Looks very much like it, since no one in the West or in Israel is developing 50-tonne FMBTs. Logically, therefore, the only bidder for offering a 50-tonne FMBT will be Russia’s Uralvagonzavod JSC & of course it will team up for this purpose with OFB’s Heavy Vehicles Factory, which in turn means that all this on-going talk about advancing the FRCV project through the still-undefined strategic partnership route is nothing else but pure hogwash/baloney/disinformation. All this truth is even now staring at our faces & if anyone denies this, then he/she is only engaging in self-deluding denial & make-believe. Thje reason why the ‘Pappu’ can’t pronounce Rafale is because he has never even seen that aircraft & is far more interested in the achievements of Rafael Nadal. Has anyone seen the ‘Pappu’ & his Chamchaas ever visit an Aero India or DEFEXPO expo? That alone explains how mych interest they have in national defence/military industrialisation issues.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To M PATEL: Only those with blinkers on will view the issue as being negative or positive, as opposed to making an objective, emotion-less assessment of ground realities. One must NEVER be passionate about such matters, since injection of emotions clouds one’s final judgement. Now, let’s get the foundational fundamentals right:

1) Anyone seeking to develop a 4th-gen MRCA must receive substantial technical & industrial support from an established aircraft manufacturer from the detailed design stage itself. Was this the case with the LCA project? Definitely not, since the DRDO’s ADA was left in total charge of the LCA’s developmental effort.

2) The person heading ADA ought to be a licensed aeronautical engineer who understands the mandatory need for an optimally engineered end-product. Have any of ADA’s Directors to date been licensed aeronautical engineers? NO.

3) As per universal practice, ONLY a licensed aeronautical engineer will understand that whenever any combat aircraft is being developed, it is MANDATORY to start flight-testing the initial prototytpe aircraft with its on-board cannon & internal self-protection suite ALREADY INSTALLED. Why? Elementary: internal cannopn-firing involves generation of exhaust gases & kinetic recoil that have consequences for engine air-intake design/positioning configuration & the latter affects the structural integrity of the airframe. Until these 2 factors can be quantified through flight-tests, the airframe service-life can NEVER be established. Similarly, internal self-protection suites using EW jammers radiate energy that affects the performance of other avionics LRUs, i.e. electromagnetic interference (EMI). Hence, unless the compatibility of the EW jammer with other on-board mission avionics is established, the optimal performance of the entire mission avionics suite can never be ascertained. Has all this been done so far? NO. Cannon-fire tests/qualification & internal jammer-avionics compatibility tests should have been undertaken as far back as 2006. Since this wasn’t done & still hasn’t been done (contrary to global practices), virtually the entire LCA developmental effort tantamounts to putting the cart before the horse. Again, only licensed aeronautical engineers—not internet fanboys or techies engaged in CAD—are able to comprehend suich mandatory real-life realities. Hence, all that is outstanding for the IAF to do is say & convincingly prove (through easily available empirical data) that the airframe design/robustness Tejas Mk.1 & Tejas Mk.1A is UNSOUND from a flight-safety standpoint & that will be the final nail in the coffin of these two aircraft variants!!!

4) As for LCA versus MiG-21, don’t compare apples with oranges, i.e. 4th-gen MRCA with 2nd-gen MRCA. If you want to compare quantum of testers reqd/used, then do so between the LCA & Rafale or LCA & Gripen or F-16 Block 70. MiG-21 obviously requires far less testers since it does not possess the quantum of on-board avionics the LCA Mk.1 does. Human resource is always the most expensive component of any institution & that’s why the manpower-levels of the IA & IAF have stayed frozen & have not had any increases since the 1990s-hence don’t delude yourself with wrong assumptions.

Lastly, no one from Pakistan was ever involved in designing either the FC-1 or its JF-17 variant. It was always a China-led developmental effort that was greatly aided in the mid-1980s by the US through the Super 7/Super Sabre projects. Do read up about it before giving Pakistan undue & ill-deserved credit.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To TECHNOLOGY, PHOTOGRAPHY & TRAVEL: Excellent expose on how political parties of all hues have collectively contributed to the systematic, industrial-scale destruction of the ecology of Uttarakhand:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5iC57LgZTZ0&t=71s

As the saying goes, it takes two to tango. Likewise, it takes 2 parties to usher in such destruction: 1 (politicians) to do the conning/hustling, with the other being the residents of Uttarakhand who are only too willing to be conned/hustled. Thus, the two more than deserve one another & are therefore beyond hope & beyond despair!

Anonymous said...

Prasunda,

When former DAE head Dr. Anil Kakodkar (who was deeply ivolved in the 1998 tests) has repeatedly asserted that our deterrent includes thermonuclear (not just boosted fission) weapons with yields upto 200 kt, what is the reason for any doubt on this front?

GSLV

Millard Keyes said...

Rajesh Mishra aka mr Ra13 you might like this link:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F0pHu6Gi13I

Senthil Kumar said...

Dear Prasun,

Egypt knew no Pharaohs nor Israelite (Book trailer)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n1eBpq40kXk

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EE9Lbu9_bVA

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cIA7l0YWlMg

Very good book which gives full evidences that Exodus Never happened in Egypt.

Most of the biblical stories are fake written to enslave the whole world.

Thanks
S.Senthil Kumar

Suvo said...

PRASUN DA,
1) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iqnnikx-NUY

2) Pakistan unveils 1,700-year-old sleeping Buddha.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-religion/pakistan-unveils-1700-year-old-sleeping-buddha-evoking-diverse-heritage-idUSKBN1DF2RK

Unknown said...

Hello Prasunji!
1.Don't you think that French can help us for FMBT.I know they haven't made any lighter tank but atleast they have experience in making a decent MBT as well as it's engine.
2.Which is best MANPAD for IA as per you?
3.Do you see bright future for India in the field of Rifle Optics manufacturing?
4.When should Tavor 7 along with OFB 762 rifle will get finalized and ordered?

Unknown said...

And here are some questions related to strategy:
6.General Nicolson said that Pak hasn't changed itself.But on the other hand,recently COAS Bipin Rawat said that it will take upto June to get all required Ammo.So does that mean we have to wait till June or the "action" will begin from March-April only?
7.Sir what is Iran's stand in that action especiallly now after Qamar Bajwa visited Iran recently?

Pratap said...

Prasun, you are saying that there is no option available except the Armata universal platform. But isn't the US working on a whole range of future ground combat vehicles which it has offered to develop and produce with India under DTTI? If the army and govt has no faith in domestic industry than why not grab the US offer?

Rajesh Mishra said...

@Pierre Zorin :

Thanx. In my opinion Jesus existed and was educated at places like Tibet, Laddakh and Varanasi. He may be like a Buddhist teacher. King Shalivahan (Son of King Vikramaditya) is stated to have met him in Kashmir.

Rajesh Mishra said...

@S.Senthil Kumar:

This all in videos is a pure muslamic propaganda. Jews (Yadu/Yahudi/Kanh/Khan) were among and helpers to the IE/Indian peoples and kingdoms like Hittie, Hurrians, Mittani, Mithras, Hyksos etc. Jews helped the Hyksos branch of Pharaohs to conquer and establish over almost whole of Egypt. Somehow once they got isolated completely and to save their lives they have to run away from Egypt called exodus. Exodus is real as the golden calf venerating people have to return back through Iran to India.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

Time for A K Antony to be crucified: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnfoI8UIQmk&t=119s

If these revelations are true, then Antony was not only violating the DPP procedures, but was also engaging in backdoor, illegal discussions with Eurofighter GmbH! This in itself implies criminal breach of turst on Antony's part.

To RAD Watch these Gen-5 MRCAs & how they are being developed:

Airbus Defence & Space Gen-5 MRCA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TNkfPRtIKJA

South Korea's KF-X21 Gen-5 MRCA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLB8eRkEPjg

AESA-MMR https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cm4ubsHI0sA

AESA-MMR https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sy8vqVZVI2I

Japan's Mitsubishi ATD-X X-2 Shinshin MRCA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Gp9jCDrlFM
(watch how Japan's ASDF from the very outset is embedded with Mitsubishi from the technology demonstration stage)

Saab's Flygsystem 2020 MRCA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-_BvFadE7w

Lockheed Martin Gen-6 MRCA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=73Ml2rmFoZA

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To PRATAP: LoLz! The US' future FICV itself weighs a whopping 63 tonnes! And no one in the West or in Israel is developing 50-tonne FMBTs. And if at all they are developed in future, then rest assured that they will weigh more than 60 tonnes but with more powerful powerpacks.

To SUVO: Let me take you down to the past by offering this:

Pakistan Smuggling Out Buddhist Statues: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FJtETSa5KUo

To INTOLERANT PERSON: How can anyone except Russia help India procure 50-tonne MBTs when France, the US, Germany & Israel have no plans whatsoever of developing FMBTs weighing 50 tonnes? As for strategy, Pakistan is rapidly headed for dollarisation of its economy--an assured recipe for disaster:

Pak Economy 17-11-2017 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xqxumJOW6XA

It is the only country today whose Federal Finance Minister, since he has been indicted on corruption charges, can;t even sign from his own chequebook!

Meanwhile, thanks to CPEC, Gilgit-Baltistan is on the boil once again:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1fG_HbHONXM

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRDHq89ktBk

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p5S1Wcnvfp0

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MXOoKBbDk5U

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBkmGcp-7n8

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PopeQ5BDHDw

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hGcrG8zX80U

And Balochistan is relentlessly bleeding: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kyF57O9Q-RQ&t=228s

And what will be KSA Prince Mohammed Bin Salman's next move?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RYSw3tfGzw

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zj7lVFVFgxU

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R2jllzAy1BU

While the KSA & Israel are now engaged in a tight embrace:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yO5ceXyTKmM

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hCLWk8aKqyc

The Pak PM & PA's COAS are going to Riyadh on November 21 with a begging bowl. Can Pakistan therefore expect Iran to just keep quiet & do nothing? Therefore, expect Balochistan to flare up even more with Iran's blessings, which will cause more Pakistani ISTAR resources to be diverted along its western borders. And this will last till the middle of next year. The window of opportunity for India's plans for PoK is thus on-track for opening up by April next year. For, even at the Dubai 2017 air show, the buzz among the visiting Pak military officers there was that India has been preparing for the past 3 years for capturing PoK by all means.

Pierre Zorin said...

As Prasun said, to conserve space, I won't take up off topic issues here. But if as you say Senthil Kumar, just looking at a one sided one or two videos you can make up your mind and pass judgment ignoring all other corroborating evidence - lucky we don't have courts following that same method. You can only enslave someone by using power, force and the person or persons enslaved loses all power and free will. The very fact you can ignore what is being purported to be the truth and deny it proves you still have your free will and are free to choose to believe whatever you want. Can you see your fallacy regarding your conclusion my friend?

Anonymous said...

Prasunda,

Would India be able to capture POK in the absence of strategic surprise ? The enemy appears to be expecting such an attempt

Ashwatthama

Senthil Kumar said...

@Rajesh Mishra

Kindly read the book. You will get more info. It is not muslamic propaganda. Guy is historian with archeological background.

Nowhere in Egypt paintings, artifacts etc. there is any proof of Moses, or joseph or even Abraham. This entire exodus story happens in Arabia. Jews & Arabs have the same culture.
Even in jews bible there is no mention of Pyramids.

@Pierre Zorin

Jesus is real and he follows the Buddha teachings. But bible is corrupted version. They set the Jesuit in Rome and enslaved the whole world by Propaganda.

Jews called themselves as "GODS CHOSEN PEOPLE". Do you agree that god told this to jews.

As per RSS Co-Founder Jesus is a Tamil Hindu. Do you agree?

http://www.mid-day.com/articles/jesus-christ-was-a-tamil-hindu-claims-rss-founders-controversial-book/16978186
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/jesus-christ-tamil-hindu-rss/1/602926.html


Freely download the book.
https://www.scribd.com/doc/72478944/Jesus-Christ-Was-a-Hindu

Thanks
S.Senthil Kumar

Unknown said...

Prasun, I had a few questions:
1) What is the Situation with war wastage reserves have they been sorted, Also you said the US will do an operation in Pakistan in 2018 will that timeline also move forward?
2) Brahmos 2 and HSTDV what is the timeline for these 2 projects.
3) What is your view on Indian Laser DEW and Railgun projects, both in terms of research approach and financial feasibility?


SUJOY MAJUMDAR said...

PrasunDa,

All the suggestions that you (and some other posters) provide in this blog about improving the overall condition of the Aerospace & Defense industry in India are well intentioned and must be applauded.

However, the reason why none of those suggestions, no matter how well intentioned they are ever implemented by Govt of India is because India is essentially a Lower Class country and not a Middle Class country.

In societies that are predominantly Middle Class like Japan, Singapore, Western Europe, US etc good intentions are almost immediately lapped up by society, but in a lower class society like India most people do not have the capacity to even remotely understand the values associated with good intentions.

Since 1947, political parties have worked 24/7 to increase the population of lower class people in this country so that they can easily be satisfied with subsidies & maybe even reservation. Consider this, just 7% of litterate Indians have a graduate degree or above.

This explains why even 70 yrs after Independence India remains a 3rd World country unlike Japan, South Korea, China & Singapore whose conditions were much worse than India in 1947 but are today developed states.

Thanks,
Sujoy

Unknown said...

Hi prasun da
Latest media news is that Mod has decided to cancel the short range spike missile contract desperately needed by army in favor of nag. This has become a norm now to cancel contracts after contracts. THE way PSU s are getting away I think soon no one will invest in defence in India. Frankly this govt is as bad as Congress when it comes to defence. I will stop following defence news. Can't see the situation going by to worse

ConcernedCitizen said...

Hi Prasun,

I would appreciate if you could elaborate on proposed reforms in defence production and procurement and the current status of such reforms. Because from the way you talked about tejas developmental failures there seems to be a lack of communication and coordination between defence development, sales, maintainence and the four armed forces.

rad said...

HI PRASUN
why is the south korean minesweeper deal so expensive as to warrant 32,000 crore .? how many are we going to get for that amount?

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ministry-of-defence-scraps-500-million-israeli-missile-deal-wants-drdo-to-make-in-india-4945571/

And this will be the replacement for Milan-2/Milan-2T:

https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-m6jD7M5zsjA/WKta--lz4MI/AAAAAAAAMgQ/_UAikc7t2xgjqSb7fpmMOMzOvqiP24gUACLcB/s1600/MPATGM.jpg

https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-8JerLHmGe_c/WKtdN7KlIII/AAAAAAAAMgo/5G3AY3nl_n06Zs6Un9nAVBrsYRjcSb7mACLcB/s1600/VEM%2BTechnologies-built%2BMPATGM.jpg

Several 'desi' patrakaars had been speculating for the past 3 years about the Spike. So now all those morons stand exposed & once again I get to have the last laugh!!!

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